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The Role of Public Reason in Obergefell v. Hodges
Robert Katz*
In Obergefell v. Hodges,1 the United States Supreme Court held in a 5-
4 decision that same-sex couples have a constitutional right to obtain a civil 
marriage. The decision yielded five opinions: the majority opinion, written 
by Justice Anthony Kennedy and joined by Justices Ruth Bader Ginsburg, 
Stephen Breyer, Sonia Sotomayor, and Elena Kagan, and four separate 
dissents written by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Antonin Scalia, 
Clarence Thomas, and Samuel Alito, respectively. When read together, the 
five opinions are unsatisfying because they mostly talk past one another. 
Kennedy’s opinion locates the right to same-sex marriage (SSM) in the Due 
Process and Equal Protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment.2 The 
dissents condemn the majority for usurping democratic decision making3
and threatening religious freedom.4
This Essay argues that despite appearances, Roberts’ and Kennedy’s 
Obergefell opinions share deep commonalities that can be discerned by 
reading them through the lens of public reason. Public reason is the idea 
that the “moral or political rules that regulate our common life be, in some 
sense, justifiable or acceptable to all those persons over whom the rules 
*  Professor of Law, Indiana University Robert H. McKinney School of Law (“IU McKinney”). 
My deepest thanks to Stephen Macedo, my undergraduate thesis advisor, mentor, and friend. I am 
grateful for the assistance of research assistant Ryan Heeb, J.D. Candidate, IU McKinney (expected 
2017); Miriam Murphy and the librarians and staff of Ruth Lilly Law Library; Eric Chaffee and other 
members of the faculty of the University of Toledo College of Law who attended my presentation on 
March 31, 2016; editors and members of the FIU Law Review; and fellow participants of the Religion 
and the Law Symposium hosted by the FIU Law Review and held at the Florida International University 
College of Law on October 23, 2015. I dedicate this Essay to the memory of Warren Schwartz. 
1  135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015). 
2 Id. at 2597–2605. 
3 See, e.g., id. at 2612 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (“[This dissent is] about whether, in our 
democratic republic, that decision should rest with the people acting through their elected 
representatives, or with five lawyers who happen to hold commissions authorizing them to resolve legal 
disputes according to law.”); id. at 2627 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“This practice of constitutional revision 
by an unelected committee of nine . . . robs the People of . . . the freedom to govern themselves.”); id. at
2631 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (The Petitioners “ask nine judges on this Court to enshrine their definition 
of marriage in the Federal Constitution and thus put it beyond the reach of the normal democratic 
process for the entire Nation.”); id. at 2642 (Alito, J., dissenting) (“Today’s decision usurps the 
constitutional right of the people to decide whether to keep or alter the traditional understanding of 
marriage.”).
4 See, e.g., id. at 2625 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (“Today’s decision . . . creates serious 
questions about religious liberty.”); id. at 2638 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“[T]he majority’s decision 
threatens the religious liberty our Nation has long sought to protect.”); id. at 2642–43 (Alito, J., 
dissenting).
37792-fiu_11-1 Sheet No. 92 Side B      04/28/2016   10:11:02
37792-fiu_11-1 Sheet No. 92 Side B      04/28/2016   10:11:02
C M
Y K
10 - KATZ_FINAL_4.15.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 4/15/16 8:18 PM
178 FIU Law Review [Vol. 11:177 
purport to have authority.”5 Political philosopher John Rawls developed the 
idea of public reason to address the problem of stability in constitutional 
democracies.6 “[H]ow is it possible,” he asks, “for there to exist over time a 
just and stable society of free and equal citizens, who remain profoundly 
divided by reasonable religious, philosophical, and moral doctrines?”7 The 
term “comprehensive doctrine”8 (a.k.a. “creed”) refers to a person’s views 
“about God and life, right and wrong, good and bad.”9 Rawls describes the 
persistence of a certain kind of deep diversity as “the fact of reasonable 
pluralism.”10
Public reason isn’t just an idea; it is also an ideal.11 As commentator 
Steven Mazie writes, “[i]t isn’t possible for anyone—even a Supreme Court 
Justice—to completely divorce herself from her religious or ideological 
commitments for the sake of political (or even legal) deliberation.”12 In 
Rawls’ view, a supreme court serves as an “exemplar” of public reason 
(notwithstanding its members’ frailties) whose opinions can give the idea 
“vividness and vitality”13 and “help model it for the rest of us.”14
This Essay aims to show the validity and value of using the idea of 
public reason to explore Roberts’ and Kennedy’s Obergefell opinions. 
Important elements of these opinions, it argues, draw heavily upon the idea 
of public reason or something akin to it.15 Each relies on certain claims and 
assumptions about the nature, scope, and proper use of public reason in 
judicial decision making and public discussion. They disagree or diverge on 
certain points and engage in some back and forth. 
Roberts accuses Kennedy of violating public reason by grounding the 
right to SSM on a sectarian creed, namely, the comprehensive liberalism 
espoused by John Stuart Mill.16 Kennedy implicitly reproves citizens who 
5  Jonathan Quong, Public Reason, § 6, THE STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (Edward
N. Zalta ed., Summer 2013), http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2013/entries/public-reason.
6  JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM xvi–xviii (1995).
7 Id. at xviii; see id. at xviii, 58–66 (discussing the distinction between simple pluralism and 
“reasonable” pluralism). 
8 Id. at 13. 
9  Leif Wenar, John Rawls, § 3.2, THE STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (Edward N. 
Zalta ed., Sept. 24, 2013), http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2013/entries/rawls.
10 John Rawls, The Idea of Public Reason Revisited, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 765, 765–66 (1977) (The 
“fact of reasonable pluralism” denotes “the fact that a plurality of conflicting reasonable comprehensive 
doctrines . . . is the normal result of its culture of free institutions.”). 
11  JOHN RAWLS, COLLECTED PAPERS 576 (Samuel Freeman ed., 1999). 
12  STEVEN V. MAZIE, AMERICAN JUSTICE 2015: THE DRAMATIC TENTH TERM OF THE ROBERTS
COURT 5 (2015).
13  RAWLS, supra note 6, at 235. 
14  MAZIE, supra note 12, at 5. 
15  For convenience, I also use the term “public reason” to refer to the analyses in Kennedy’s and 
Roberts’ opinions that resemble or call to mind Rawls’ idea of public reason. 
16 See infra notes 37–41 and accompanying text. 
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support SSM bans on religious grounds, perhaps gesturing towards a civic 
duty or etiquette to refrain from supporting laws based solely on one’s 
creed.17 Roberts in turn criticizes Kennedy for unfairly applying the 
demands of public reason to ordinary citizens.18 In these ways, Roberts and 
Kennedy act less like exemplars of public reason and more like 
whistleblowers of others’ violations and misapplications of the idea. 
This Essay aims simply to explore the role that the idea of public 
reason plays in Roberts’ and Kennedy’s Obergefell opinions. It does not 
attempt to answer the many challenging questions it raises about the idea                                            
on the merits. 
***
According to Stephen Macedo, a leading liberal theorist, “the idea of 
public reason focuses on public deliberative forums when legislators and 
other public officials are deciding for all matters that touch on basic 
principles of justice.”19 We rightly expect public officials—and a supreme 
court above all—to defend their decisions by appealing to reasons that all 
reasonable persons could endorse.20 In deciding cases, writes Rawls, 
justices cannot “invoke their own personal morality, nor the ideals and 
virtues of morality generally.”21 Rather, “they must view [these] as 
irrelevant.”22
Not all justices embrace the idea of public reason. Consider the 2015 
open letter written by the Honorable Roy S. Moore, Chief Justice of the 
Alabama Supreme Court. Moore wrote: 
The laws of this state have always recognized the Biblical admonition 
stated by our Lord [that] “from the beginning of the creation God 
made them male and female. For this cause shall a man leave father 
and mother, and cleave to his wife; And they twain shall be one 
flesh.”23
17 See infra notes 42–61 and accompanying text. 
18 See infra notes 62–68 and accompanying text. 
19  Stephen Macedo, Why Public Reason? Citizens’ Reasons and the Constitution of the Public 
Sphere 20 (Aug. 23, 2010) (unpublished manuscript), http://ssrn.com/abstract=1664085.
20  Quong, supra note 5, § 6 (citing RAWLS, supra note 11, at 576–77). 
21  RAWLS, supra note 6, at 236. 
22 Id.
23  Letter from Roy S. Moore, Chief Justice, Alabama Supreme Court, to Hon. Robert Bentley, 
Gov. of Alabama (Jan. 27, 2015), http://media.al.com/news_impact/other/Read%20Chief%20Justice%
20Moore%20letter.pdf (quoting Mark 10:6–9). Moore’s letter also quotes from an 1870 Alabama 
Supreme Court opinion describing marriage as “a divine institution” that imposes upon spouses “higher 
moral and religious obligations than those imposed by any mere human institution or government.” Id.
(quoting Hughes v. Hughes, 44 Ala. 698, 703 (1870)). 
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Political theorist Leif Wenar anticipated statements like these. “[A] 
Supreme Court justice deciding on a gay marriage law would violate public 
reason,” wrote Wenar in 2013, 
were she to base her opinion on God’s forbidding gay sex in the book 
of Leviticus, or on a presentiment that upholding such a law would 
hasten the end of days. Not all members of society can reasonably be 
expected to accept Leviticus as stating an authoritative set of political 
values, nor can a religious premonition be a common standard for 
evaluating public policy. These values and standards are not public.24
Moore’s approach is the antithesis of Roberts’ Obergefell dissent, and 
the idea of public reason helps explain why. Roberts invokes Justice Oliver 
Wendell Holmes, Jr.’s admonition that “the Constitution ‘is made for 
people of fundamentally differing views.’”25 For this reason, Roberts 
believes that courts should apply what he calls “neutral principles of 
constitutional law.”26 This approach helps judges resist the temptation, in 
his words, “to confuse our own preferences with the requirements of the 
law.”27 In a similar vein, Kennedy refers to “the judicial duty [of courts] to 
base their decisions on principled reasons and neutral discussions.”28 These 
statements resonate with Rawls’ claim that public officials, especially 
justices, are obliged to explain their decisions in publicly reasonable terms 
and to refrain from deciding matters on the basis of comprehensive 
doctrines.
Public reason does not restrict what everybody can say about anything. 
“[T]he limits imposed by public reason do not apply to all political 
questions,” Rawls writes, but only those involving certain matters—most 
notably the “constitutional essentials” of a constitutional democracy.29
These include “equal basic rights and liberties of citizenship that legislative 
majorities are to respect.”30 Obergefell effectively decides that the ability of 
same-sex couples to marry is a constitutional essential in this sense.31
***
In Roberts’ view, Kennedy’s opinion violates public reason by 
justifying the right to SSM based on a form of comprehensive or sectarian 
24  Wenar, supra note 9, § 3.6.
25  Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 1584, 2612 (2015) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (quoting 
Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 76 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting)). 
26 Id.
27 Id.
28 Id. at 2597. 
29  RAWLS, supra note 6, at 227.
30 Id.
31 See, e.g., Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2598 (citations omitted) (“[T]he Court has reiterated that 
the right to marry is fundamental under the Due Process Clause.”). 
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liberalism, the class of which, Rawls writes, “include[s] conceptions of 
what is of value in human life, ideals of personal virtue and character that 
are to inform our thought and conduct as a whole.”32 Rawls distinguishes 
comprehensive liberalisms from political liberalism, the scope and aims of 
which are more modest. The latter seeks to provide “a political framework 
that is neutral between . . . controversial comprehensive doctrines,” 
including comprehensive liberalisms.33 By grounding the right to SSM on 
the creed of comprehensive liberalism, charges Roberts, Kennedy’s opinion 
violates the demands of public reason. The five members of the majority, he 
asserts, have “enacted their own vision of marriage as a matter of 
constitutional law,”34 and this vision is grounded in turn on a “moral 
philosophy” that “elevat[es] . . . the fullest individual self-realization over 
the constraints that society has expressed in law.”35 Although this vision 
“may have [force] as a matter of moral philosophy,”36 it is not neutral as 
between competing visions of marriage espoused (as it were) by competing 
creeds.
To support this charge, Roberts cites Kennedy’s appeal to the famous 
“harm principle” formulated by John Stuart Mill, whom Rawls counts as 
one of the foremost expounders of a comprehensive liberalism.37 Mill 
famously declared that “the only purpose for which power can be rightfully 
exercised over any member of a civilized community, against his will, is to 
prevent harm to others.”38 The cases at bar in Obergefell, writes Kennedy, 
“involve only the rights of two consenting adults whose marriages would 
pose no risk of harm to themselves or third parties.”39 Kennedy’s “assertion 
32  RAWLS, supra note 11, at 427.
33  Gerald Gaus, Shane D. Courtland & David Schmidtz, Liberalism, § 3.1, THE STANFORD
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (Edward N. Zalta ed., Spring 2015), http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/
spr2015/entries/liberalism.
34 Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2612 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting); see also id. at 2621 (Roberts, C.J., 
dissenting) (“The truth is that today’s decision rests on nothing more than the majority’s own conviction 
that same-sex couples should be allowed to marry because they want to, and that ‘it would disparage 
their choices and diminish their personhood to deny them this right.’”). 
35 Id. at 2622 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
36 Id.
37  RAWLS, supra note 11, at 427. 
38  JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 9 (Elizabeth Rapaport ed., 1978).
39 Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2606–07. The majority noted: 
The respondents also argue allowing same-sex couples to wed will harm marriage as an institution 
by leading to fewer opposite-sex marriages. This may occur, the respondents contend, because 
licensing same-sex marriage severs the connection between natural procreation and marriage. That 
argument, however, rests on a counterintuitive view of opposite-sex couple’s decision-making 
processes regarding marriage and parenthood. Decisions about whether to marry and raise children 
are based on many personal, romantic, and practical considerations; and it is unrealistic to 
conclude that an opposite-sex couple would choose not to marry simply because same-sex couples 
may do so. 
Id.
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of the ‘harm principle,’” writes Roberts, 
sounds more in philosophy than law . . . . But a Justice’s commission 
does not confer any special moral, philosophical, or social insight 
sufficient to justify imposing those perceptions on fellow citizens 
under the pretense of “due process.” . . . [T]he Fourteenth Amendment 
does not enact John Stuart Mill’s On Liberty . . . . And it certainly does 
not enact any one concept of marriage.40
By invoking the “harm principle,” Roberts contends, “the majority offers 
perhaps the clearest insight into its decision”41—namely, that it is grounded 
on sectarian liberalism. It is the smoking gun that kills any pretense of 
neutrality among competing comprehensive doctrines. 
* * * 
At several points in his opinion, Kennedy discusses comprehensive 
doctrines that disapprove of SSM and their followers. One such doctrine 
holds that marriage “is by its nature a gender-differentiated union of man 
and woman.”42 Kennedy professes respect for this position and its 
adherents. “This view,” he writes, “long has been held—and continues to be 
held—in good faith by reasonable and sincere people here and throughout 
the world.”43 In a similar vein, he writes that “[m]any who deem same-sex 
marriage to be wrong reach that conclusion based on decent and honorable 
religious or philosophical premises, and neither they nor their beliefs are 
disparaged here.”44
From Kennedy’s perspective, there is nothing problematic per se about 
religiously-grounded disapproval of SSM. Problems arise, however, when 
such disapproval is enacted into law. “[W]hen that sincere, personal 
opposition becomes enacted law and public policy,” he writes, “the 
necessary consequence is to put the imprimatur of the State itself on an 
exclusion that soon demeans or stigmatizes those whose own liberty is then 
denied.”45
But what exactly is problematic about SSM bans? Such bans of course 
inflict material46 and non-material47 harms to same-sex couples and their 
40 Id. at 2622 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
41 Id.
42 Id. at 2594. 
43 Id.
44 Id. at 2603; see also id. at 2597 (referring to “the judicial duty [of courts] to base their 
decisions on principled reasons and neutral discussions, without scornful or disparaging commentary”)
(emphasis added). 
45 Id. at 2602. 
46  Bans on SSM exclude same-sex couples and their families from the many of the legal rights 
and benefits to which different-sex married couples are entitled. The incidents of marital status under 
state law typically include: 
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families. Yet there is another problem with such bans, one that is harder for 
Kennedy to articulate but which is suggested by the following passage. “[I]t 
must be emphasized,” writes Kennedy, 
that religions, and those who adhere to religious doctrines, may 
continue to advocate with utmost, sincere conviction that, by divine 
precepts, same-sex marriage should not be condoned. The First 
Amendment ensures that religious organizations and persons are given 
proper protection as they seek to teach the principles that are so 
fulfilling and so central to their lives and faiths, and to their own deep 
aspirations to continue the family structure they have long revered. . . . 
In turn, those who believe allowing same-sex marriage is proper or 
indeed essential . . . may engage those who disagree with their view in 
an open and searching debate. The Constitution, however, does not 
permit the State to bar same-sex couples from marriage on the same 
terms as accorded to couples of the opposite sex.48
Kennedy here speaks directly to religiously-motivated SSM opponents 
who are asking themselves where to go from here. How do they move 
forward now that SSM is the law of the land? They should shift their 
energies away from lawmaking forums, Kennedy suggests, and instead seek 
wider acceptance of their beliefs about traditional marriage in the 
marketplace of ideas.49 They may teach these beliefs diligently to their 
children, speak of them when they walk by the way,50 and live their lives 
according to these precepts. Yet they must henceforth refrain from seeking 
to enact SSM bans or other laws aimed at thwarting same-sex couples from 
exercising their right to SSM. 
taxation; inheritance and property rights; rules of intestate succession; spousal privilege in the law 
of evidence; hospital access; medical decision-making authority; adoption rights; the rights and 
benefits of survivors; birth and death certificates; professional ethics rules; campaign finance 
restrictions; workers’ compensation benefits; health insurance; and child custody, support, and 
visitation rules. Valid marriage under state law is also a significant status for over a thousand 
provisions of federal law. 
Id. at 2601 (citations omitted).
47 Non-material harms include the legal instability experienced by same-sex couples and their 
families, and the implicit message that gays and lesbians are unequal in important respects. Id. at 2601–
02.
48 Id. at 2607 (emphases added). 
49 See Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
50 See Deuteronomy 6:7 (King James), www.kingjamesbibleonline.org/Deuteronomy-6-7. It is 
surely not the case, as Alito suggests, that SSM opponents might only express their views when they sit 
in their houses. See Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2642–43 (Alito, J., dissenting) (“I assume that those who 
cling to old beliefs will be able to whisper their thoughts in the recesses of their homes, but if they repeat 
those views in public, they will risk being labeled as bigots and treated as such by governments, 
employers, and schools.”). 
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Kennedy’s remarks here, I submit, signal or suggest a reproof to 
ordinary citizens who support SSM bans on the basis of their religious 
beliefs.51 It isn’t just the harms such bans inflict on same-sex couples and 
their families that count. In a constitutional democracy, Kennedy suggests, 
there is something independently troubling about pushing for a law that 
denies a basic civil right on grounds that one’s creed countenances or even 
demands such advocacy or enactments. This reproof presupposes the breach 
of some duty—perhaps a duty to refrain from advocating and voting for 
laws that cannot be justified on grounds that are intelligible or potentially 
acceptable to fellow citizens who do not share one’s creed. 
Kennedy’s discussion of religiously-motivated supporters of SSM bans 
connects to a debate among liberal theorists as to “what duties, if any, . . . 
the idea of public reason impose[s] on individuals.”52 In Rawls’ view, 
public reason
imposes a moral, not a legal, duty . . . to be able to explain to one 
another on those fundamental questions how the principles and 
policies they advocate and vote for can be supported by the political 
values of public reason.53
Rawls calls this duty the “duty of civility.”54 “For Rawls,” explains Mazie, 
it is essential that people consider what kinds of reasons they may 
reasonably give one another when fundamental political questions are 
at stake. It is a nonstarter to simply restate your personal religious or 
moral commitments, as others may not share them. Citizens need to 
give each other warrants for their claims that their friends, foes, and 
neighbors could accept without having to fundamental change who 
they are or where their metaphysical commitments may lie.55
This duty, Macedo writes, applies only to citizens discussing certain 
measures in certain venues. 
Citizens take part in many deliberative settings––informally, or in civil 
society, in churches, over office water coolers, in bars, and at home––
where norms of public reason have no proper role. The crucial venue 
for public reason is when some are deciding for all what the law will 
51  Kennedy’s remarks may also apply to religiously-motivated supporters of other legal means 
for blocking same-sex couples from exercising their right to SSM.  
52  This is the question is addressed by Quong, supra note 5, § 6.
53  RAWLS, supra note 6, at 217; see also Macedo, supra note 19, at 1 (“[T]he idea of public 
reason holds that those advocating laws and policies that touch on basic constitutional principles ought 
to offer adequate supporting reasons that could be shared by all reasonable members of the political 
community.”).
54  RAWLS, supra note 6, at 217.
55  MAZIE, supra note 12, at 5 (quotation omitted).
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be concerning basic justice.56
The duty of civility calls upon citizens “to think of themselves as if they 
were legislators.”57 When widely embraced, the duty of civility promotes 
the stability of constitutional democracy. (Alternatively, it helps “secure the 
blessings of liberty to ourselves and our posterity.”58) As Rawls writes: 
When firm and widespread, the disposition of citizens to view 
themselves as ideal legislators, and to repudiate government officials 
and candidates for public office who violate public reason, is one of 
the political and social roots of democracy, and is vital to its enduring 
strength and vigor.59
In sum, in order to reprove ordinary citizens who support SSM bans based 
on religious grounds, Kennedy may need to presume that such persons are 
bound by something along the lines of Rawls’ duty of civility. 
One wonders why Kennedy discusses ordinary citizens who oppose 
SSM at all. What does he hope his discussion to accomplish? Roberts more 
or less asks the same question. “Perhaps the most discouraging aspect of 
today’s decision,” he writes, “is the extent to which the majority feels 
compelled to sully those on the other side of the debate.”60 For 
“discouraging,” one might substitute the word “perplexing.” Several 
sentences later, Roberts writes that “[i]t is one thing for the majority to 
conclude that the Constitution protects a right to same-sex marriage; it is 
something else to portray everyone who does not share the majority’s 
‘better informed understanding’ as bigoted.”61 Roberts has a point: Kennedy 
could have simply stuck to his knitting. No opponent of SSM asked him for 
advice on what she ought to do—or refrain from doing—next. Perhaps 
Kennedy’s aim in offering such advice was not, as Roberts insinuates, to 
smear or insult opponents of SSM, but to instruct them. (This can be its 
own insult of course because the would-be instructor presumes that he is 
qualified to offer such instruction and that the intended audience would 
benefit from following it.) 
* * * 
Roberts says some harsh things about the Obergefell majority. To state 
the matter plainly, he denounces them as hypocrites and sectarian liberals. 
This is understandable. In Roberts’ view (as restated in terms of public 
56  Macedo, supra note 19, at 20. 
57  RAWLS, supra note 11, at 577 (emphasis in original). 
58  U.S. CONST. pmbl. 
59  RAWLS, supra note 11, at 577.
60  Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 1584, 2626 (2015) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (emphasis 
added).
61 Id.
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reason), the majority betray their judicial duty by justifying a right to SSM 
on the basis of their preferred creed, while disparaging ordinary citizens 
who support banning SSM on the basis of their preferred creeds. This is all 
the more chutzpadik62 because ordinary citizens—unlike Supreme Court 
justices—are less obliged (if at all) to justify their stance on SSM bans in 
publicly reasonable terms. It is no coincidence, moreover, that the majority 
justices’ preferred creed is liberal while the ban’s supporters’ creeds are not 
or may reflect a different conception of constitutional democracy. 
Although Roberts intuits that Kennedy passes judgment on supporters 
of SSM bans, he perceives the judgment differently. He dismisses as 
“disclaimer” Kennedy’s professed respect for creeds that support SSM bans 
and their followers. Kennedy’s profession, writes Roberts: 
is hard to square with . . . the majority’s expla[nation] that “the 
necessary consequence” of laws codifying the traditional definition of 
marriage is to “demea[n] or stigmatiz[e]” same-sex couples. The 
majority reiterates such characterizations over and over. By the 
majority’s account, Americans who did nothing more than follow the 
understanding of marriage that has existed for our entire history—in 
particular, the tens of millions of people who voted to reaffirm their 
States’ enduring definition of marriage—have acted to “lock . . . out,” 
“disparage,” “disrespect and subordinate,” and inflict “[d]ignitary 
wounds” upon their gay and lesbian neighbors.63
Roberts accuses the majority of imputing bad motives to SSM ban 
supporters—a naked desire to harm and humiliate same-sex couples and 
their families—and of portraying them as bigoted.64
Roberts does not directly respond to Kennedy’s implied criticism of 
religiously-motivated SSM ban supporters. He avoids doing so by focusing 
on state officials and the secular arguments they advance to defend SSM 
bans, rather than the religious reasons that some ordinary citizens invoke to 
defend their support of such bans. The states’ arguments, writes Roberts, 
proceed from the obvious truth and empirical assertions that: 
[t]he human race must procreate to survive. Procreation occurs through 
sexual relations between a man and a woman. When sexual relations 
result in the conception of a child, that child’s prospects are generally 
better if the mother and father stay together rather than going their 
62  LEO ROSTEN, THE NEW JOYS OF YIDDISH 81 (2001) (Lawrence Bush ed., 2001) (chutzpadik
(adj.)) (defining chutzpah (noun) as “[g]all, brazen nerve, effrontery, incredible ‘guts’; presumption plus 
arrogance such as no other word, and no other language, can do justice to”) (pronounced “KHOOTS-
pah”).
63 Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2626 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (citations omitted).  
64 Id. (citations omitted). 
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separate ways. Therefore, for the good of children and society, sexual 
relations that can lead to procreation should occur only between a man 
and a woman committed to a lasting bond.65
Justice Alito also characterizes the state officials’ arguments as secular. 
[T]he States defending their adherence to the traditional understanding 
of marriage have explained their position using the pragmatic vocabu-
lary that characterizes most American political discourse. Their basic 
argument is that States formalize and promote marriage, unlike other 
fulfilling human relationships, in order to encourage potentially 
procreative conduct to take place within a lasting unit that has long 
been thought to provide the best atmosphere for raising children. They 
thus argue that there are reasonable secular grounds for restricting 
marriage to opposite-sex couples.66
Roberts asserts that the traditional definition of marriage is grounded on 
neither creed nor hatred. This definition, he claims, 
did not come about as a result of a . . . religious doctrine, or . . . a 
prehistoric decision to exclude gays and lesbians. It arose in the nature 
of things to meet a vital need: ensuring that children are conceived by 
a mother and father committed to raising them in the stable conditions 
of a lifelong relationship.67
Roberts’ opinion evokes the idea of public reason in several ways. 
First, Roberts does not view the alleged right to SSM as a constitutional 
essential—or at least not a basic civil right guaranteed by the federal
constitution. Thus the demands of public reason presumably do not apply. 
For this reason the U.S. Supreme Court should defer to a state’s refusal to 
grant or recognize SSMs under the state’s own law. Second, Roberts may 
believe that SSM bans satisfy public reason by virtue of the secular (and 
perhaps plausible) reasons advanced by state officials. This would be 
consistent with Roberts’ view that SSM bans would withstand review under 
“neutral principles of constitutional law.”68 Lastly, Roberts may not believe 
that ordinary citizens who support SSM bans are obliged to defend their 
position in publicly reasonable terms. Stated differently, Roberts may 
simply reject Rawls’ idea of a duty of civility. 
* * * 
This Essay, if successful, has demonstrated the validity and value of 
exploring Roberts’ and Kennedy’s Obergefell opinions through the lens of 
65 Id. at 2613 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
66 Id. at 2641 (Alito, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). 
67 Id. at 2613 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (citations omitted). 
68 Id. at 2612 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
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public reason. While it has identified many questions raised by a public 
reason reading of these opinions, it has not addressed them on the merits. 
 As a threshold matter, is the idea of public reason coherent? Is the 
distinction between political liberalism and comprehensive liberalism 
workable? Assuming the idea of public reason holds water, does Kennedy’s 
opinion meet its demands? If the opinion makes both sectarian and publicly 
reasonable arguments, do the former thereby taint or undermine the latter? 
Could Kennedy’s opinion be revised to rely exclusively on public reason 
and be persuasive? Is Rawls correct that ordinary citizens have a duty of 
civility to support only laws that are publicly reasonable? To speak out 
against proposed laws that are not? To resist such laws if enacted? To 
support the candidates most likely to enact laws that are publicly 
reasonable?
As for Roberts, to what extent does his critique of Kennedy’s opinion 
rely on public reason as opposed to federalism, separation of powers, and 
judicial restraint? How, for example, would Roberts respond to a state 
supreme court’s decision to strike down an SSM ban enacted by a state 
legislature or by referendum? Wouldn’t such a decision also usurp 
democratic decision making? Would it matter if the state supreme court’s 
justices were elected? I leave these and other critical questions for another 
day.
